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1Picture this: you and your wealthy brother are out walking in the wilderness. 
You’re idly considering pushing him off a cliff or into some handy bog, because 
you happen to know that he has no will and you’ll inherit everything as his 
only living relative, when you both see a bright light in the sky. Something 
hurtles through the clouds and crashes over the next hill. You both approach 
cautiously to see what appears to be for all the world like an alien spacecraft. 
As you get nearer, a door slides open in the side. With your bolder brother in 
the lead, you enter. Inside it appears curiously empty. No sign of life, just a 
small platform with what looks like controls on a raised dais next to it. Again 
your brother takes the lead (how you hate him!). He stands on the platform 
and reaches out and presses several buttons on the control panel. Suddenly 
there is a loud popping noise and your brother’s clothes, even his beloved 
red “Make America Great Again” hat, drop to the floor, empty of sibling. Too 
astonished to realize your wish has been granted, you are about to run out 
when you hear thumping behind what you now see is a door on the far side of 
the craft’s interior. Nervously you approach it and see that there is a button on 
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2the side. More in a trance than brave, you press the button. It slides open, and 
there is your brother – stark naked, but exhilarated. “That was AWESOME!” 
he says. “I teleported!” Before you can get a word in, he says “I’m going to do 
it again!” and dashes over to the platform. He pushes his clothes aside and 
mashes the buttons on the controls. This time, there is a flash but no noise, 
and your brother doesn’t move. But nonetheless, again you hear banging on 
the door next to you. You open it again, and there’s your brother, with a goofy 
grin …. until he sees his doppelganger. “Who the fuck is that?” they both say 
at once, coarse and uncouth as ever. 
As your now twin brothers start to squabble over who gets to wear the clothes, 
thoughts race through your head. At first, you are hit by disappointment. Not 
only did your brother survive, now it’s going to be twice as hard to get rid 
of him. But then, suddenly, your mood improves dramatically. You will get 
what you want without getting your hands dirty! Because your brother no 
longer exists. At least, according to the general consensus in the literature 
on the preservation of personal identity over time. The reasoning goes like 
this. Let’s call your original brother, pre-teleportation, A and the two current 
versions B and C. We have the following options: first, both B and C are A. 
Second, just B is A and C is not. Third, just C is A and B is not. Fourth, neither 
B nor C is A. The first one is a non-starter: they can’t both be your brother – 
you only have one. Furthermore, by the logic of identity if B=A and C=A then 
it follows that B=C, but as B and C are currently fighting with each other, that 
is obviously not the case. The second and third options are of a piece: if B and 
C are identical, then each has equal claim to be your brother, so it would be 
simply arbitrary to pick one and not the other. So that just leaves us with the 
fourth option: neither B nor C is A. So your brother has ceased to exist, and 
you are safe to claim his inheritance as his sole family member. 
You put this to the squabbling B and C, and, no surprise, they are having none 
of it. One of them, who has managed to grab the underpants and T-shirt, 
pipes up first. “But I’m the original! I was standing on the pad the second 
3time when I pressed the button and suddenly that guy appeared in that little 
room over there! He’s obviously a copy! I never moved!”
At this, the other one, currently clad in shorts and a MAGA hat, looks 
blindsided, but then turns on him and says “I’m the original! Prove I’m not! 
You can’t, can you? Every scar or mole you’ve got, I’ve got too. Even the tattoo 
of Pepe the Frog on my left buttock.” “What matters is who was by the control 
panel when the other one – you – appeared in that room,” says the one we 
shall call “B” – “and the fact that I got my underpants on proves it was me. 
Nobody would reach for anything else first, so the fact that I got them proves 
I was closest to the pile of clothes!”
It’s your turn to smile smugly at this point. “Look, you may be right. But 
it turns out it doesn’t matter. You both seem to agree that the person who 
popped into existence in the little room is a copy and not my brother. But you 
both did that, remember? The button was pressed twice.”
B is outraged: “But the first time doesn’t count! I teleported then! That’s not 
the same! My body was moved – his body was just made from scratch!”
You reply: “Think about it: if a body can be made from scratch once, then that’s 
almost certainly what happened both times, right? Otherwise where did the 
copy come from – what material was used to make it – I mean him. And look 
at all the dust you’ve stirred up fighting over your clothes. I’m willing to bet 
that’s all that’s left of my brother. My dear, dear, departed brother…” At this 
you stifle a sob, but when you look up, both brother-copies are looking at you 
with open contempt. It’s pretty obvious they know what you’re up to.
Cut to a courtroom, a few weeks later. The twins are representing themselves 
before a judge. Your lawyer presents your case first.
“It is our contention that the two people in court today who resemble my 
client’s brother Horace Dent are, in fact, clones, produced in some mysterious 
4way by alien technology, who merely believe themselves to be Mr. Dent. 
There is no precedent in law for what happened, but we argue that neither 
resembling a dead individual nor believing oneself to be him thereby makes 
oneself that person, however vividly one does so. The individuals before us 
are like unfortunate newborns, convinced they are somebody they cannot 
be. Nonetheless, my client has generously offered to give each one a yearly 
stipend of $50,000 in the memory of his dear departed brother whom they so 
closely resemble.”
In response, brother B (underpants brother, now wearing a grey suit) speaks 
first. “Your honor, first, let me introduce myself. I am Horace Dent. My greedy 
brother here is trying to argue that the fact that there are two of us means that 
neither can be the original. In response I will argue that (1) I am the original 
brother, who (2) teleported a brief distance because of the alien technology 
you see before you” (the dais and a floor panel from the little room have been 
set up in the courtroom as exhibits), “but (3) my doppelganger over there” 
(pointing to C, who has lost the MAGA hat and is wearing a blue suit) “is 
a mere copy.” (At this, C is clearly struggling to keep quiet, but manages to 
do so.) “The fact is, if I’d never pressed that button a second time, nobody 
would question that I am indeed the original person. I understand that my 
doppelganger’s situation is a strange one, as he is, in effect, a creation of 
alien technology who believes himself to be me, but his existence must be 
irrelevant to the question of whether or not I am who I say I am. And there 
can be no doubt that I am indeed that man. Put yourself in my shoes. Suppose 
somebody questioned whether or not you were who you said you were – how 
would you prove it? Well, any standard you can come up with – fingerprints, 
retinal scan, obscure memory of your past that only you could know – I can 
use to prove that I am the same person who went into that alien craft.”
C can contain himself no longer: “Hey, bad news buddy – same here!”
B snaps back: “But here’s the thing: the argument being used to prove that 
Horace Dent doesn’t exist any more requires that there be two of us. And for 
5your entire existence, I already existed, so the argument works on you. BUT, 
even if you say that I “came into existence” when the button was pressed for 
the first time, from that moment until the button was pressed a second time, 
I existed alone. So for that length of time, the argument doesn’t work against 
me, and by any standard, I’m Horace Dent. And if I was Horace Dent at any 
moment, then I can’t stop being Horace Dent just because some machine 
makes a copy of me! So, I rest my case: I’m the original, you’re a copy, and my 
slimy little brother has to come up with a new argument to get his paws on 
my money.”
Your lawyer has a rebuttal ready. “Your honor, scientists have examined both 
these gentlemen and this device that was responsible for their existence and 
are convinced that the two people in this courtroom do not share a single 
atom with the individual who walked into that alien craft and activated this 
machine. The device appears to create a complete, admittedly perfect copy, 
identical in every physical and psychological respect to the original. Both 
these men are its products, the only difference being that the first time it 
was used it also destroyed the original person. This gentleman (B) contends 
that he is our client’s brother. If that were so, he would share atoms with 
the man who existed before the machine was activated, and he does not. 
“Teleportation” is a fanciful myth – all we have here is destruction followed 
by the construction of a simulacrum.” 
Brother B responds: “Your Honor, there’s no way we can know that for sure. 
First of all, the technology is too complicated. For all we know, when I pressed 
the button for the first time my particles were literally moved and the dust 
in my clothes was just some kind of residue. Another possibility was that the 
machine performed a process like a cell dividing, so that every one of my cells 
was cloned and then whisked across the short distance between the pad and 
the room I emerged from. And finally, we know that it is possible to maintain 
identity without sharing any cells in common, because you are certainly the 
same person as you were as a baby, but we all know we replace all of our cells 
in a 7 or 8 year period.”
6The judge seems about to say something when Brother C jumps in: “I like 
your thinking, mirror-me! You make it sound like I am an outgrowth of you. 
By your cell-division reasoning, we are offshoots of the same individual. If you 
replicated the original version of Horace Dent, then I replicated you. Guess 
what? Just as you remember being Horace Dent, I remember being you. I 
have vivid memories of pressing the button both times. You could think of 
us as like those cases when they severed the corpus callosum connecting two 
hemispheres of the brain together and discovered that they had independent 
consciousnesses. The only difference is our two consciousnesses aren’t stuck 
in the same skull – we can walk around separately.” 
Brother B looks livid at this interruption, especially when your lawyer 
pounces: “Your honor, I contend that such a scenario would be more like an 
amoeba splitting, which is a real-world phenomenon. The philosopher Fred 
Feldman argues that in such a case the original amoeba no longer exists. The 
two new amoeba are new individuals. He says that this is a case where the 
original did not die, but nonetheless made what he calls a “deathless exit” 
from this world.”
Both B and C open their mouths to object to this but the judge slams down 
her gavel. “Enough! I rule that the two identical individuals before me must 
work together! They were both brought into being by the same contraption, 
admittedly mysteriously, and so there is no future in arguing that they be 
regarded differently under the law. Court is adjourned for today.”
The next day comes and the brothers seem to have struck an uneasy alliance. 
Brother B, again wearing grey, speaks first.
“Your honor, I would like to argue that both of us are distinct individuals, 
and yet both of us share equal claim to count Horace Dent as our earlier 
self. While this might seem to violate the rules of identity, my argument 
will draw from the writings of the philosopher David Lewis…” (at this, your 
7eyebrows shoot up: you have never known your brother to read anything 
except the Wall Street Journal and possibly Golfing Weekly before – clearly 
the alien technology has introduced some drastic personality changes – that 
or the potential to lose out on money) “who argued that we should look at 
individuals not as three dimensional beings, but as four-dimensional. By his 
reasoning, when I” (brother C interjects “we” – B frowns and ignores him) 
“when I pressed the button for the second time, that marked the end of the 
person-stage (which began at my conception) that I shared with (gesturing to 
C) him. Think of that moment as a fork in the road. Just as there is a stretch 
of freeway in my home state of Michigan that is both interstate 75 AND 
interstate 23, so this first section of my life was both me and my lookalike 
here. However, now we no longer share a body. Nonetheless, the fortune that 
our wastrel younger brother is endeavoring to steal from us belongs entirely 
to the two of us, distributed in proportions that we will settle amongst 
ourselves once this farce is over.”
The judge looks puzzled. “Are you saying you – or rather, Horace Dent - had 
a split personality the whole time?”
“Not really, Your Honor: think of it like a pair of conjoined twins who share 
certain organs, say heart and lungs. You don’t think of the heart and lungs 
having “split personalities” – they’re just individual organs used by two 
people. But in our case, we are two four-dimensional beings who share a 
temporal part rather than a physical part. The part we shared existed from 
1965 until the button was pressed that produced my identical counterpart 
here.”
Your lawyer speaks up now. “First of all, not everyone accepts this idea of 
“temporal parts.” But second, David Lewis never really addresses the issue of 
what conditions are necessary to preserve identity. It is our contention that 
whatever the machine did in creating both these gentlemen, one thing it did 
for certain was kill our client’s brother. Yesterday, one of these gentlemen 
(I forget which) tried to argue that because we change all our cells over a 
8years-long period, that sharing cells is not important for identity. But that’s 
obviously not true. You can rebuild a boat plank by plank, but if you get rid 
of all of the planks at once and then build a boat that looks like the original 
out of entirely new wood, you have a new boat and the old one is gone. But 
even if these gentlemen were produced by some kind of cell division, we have 
precedent for arguing that the original no longer exists. Even some Catholic 
theologians who want to place the existence of an individual as early as 
possible have conceded that the phenomenon of twinning means that life 
cannot begin at conception. They argue that, for as long as it is possible for 
an embryo to divide and become twins an individual cannot exist, because 
that would mean that both individuals could lay claim to existing prior to 
the division, and this is intolerable. And for good reason! Let’s be clear about 
what this gentleman is arguing! The claim is that Horace Dent was somehow 
“part” of both of them, which implies that he was always two people, and 
yet never knew this! Think of the implications! If we establish a precedent 
whereby the property of one individual can become the property of two 
new individuals because of a claim of “shared person-stages” what kind 
of floodgates would that open? How are we to know whether or not these 
new individuals won’t split again? Suppose somebody claims to be a future 
“person stage” of some currently existing individual and demands a share of 
their money, citing alien time-travel technology. For all we know, there really 
might be such technology – but should we allow that in the law?”
The twin brothers grow more and more incensed as this speech goes on, and 
finally Brother C explodes: “But it was me who made that money! It was me 
who pressed the button on that damn machine! I know in exactly the same 
way you know that it was you who walked into this courtroom half an hour 
ago – I remember doing it. Why do you think you own that nice watch you’re 
wearing? Because you remember buying it, right? With money that you 
earned, right? But how do you know you earned it? Exactly the same way I 
know the money that my no-good little brother is trying to steal is mine! Yes, 
something unprecedented happened to me – so what? For all you know God 
is remaking you every instant. The you that is standing there could just be an 
9identical copy of the you that was standing there a second earlier. How would 
you know? The fact is, it doesn’t matter, because memory is what matters, 
as John Locke argued centuries ago. For all of us our only real evidence that 
we existed yesterday is that we remember doing so. Well, both me and my 
counterpart have just as vivid memories of pressing that button as you do 
about anything in your past. How would you feel if your brother came up with 
some trumped up reason why you don’t own your nice watch just because he 
wants it for himself? The only argument in defense of stealing MY MONEY 
is the old, A can’t be both B and C if B does not equal C argument. But why 
should that matter? When my counterpart here was the only one, hardly 
anyone would’ve questioned that I had survived. But as soon as there’s two of 
us, suddenly it’s a problem. But why should double success suddenly count as 
failure? If we drew straws and one of us committed suicide, would that make 
you happy? Why should we be bothered about the logic of identity?”
Your lawyer smirks a little (and you are suddenly less resentful of her 
exorbitant fee): “I see you are using Derek Parfit’s argument that “identity is 
not what matters.” As you say, he suggests that if we would count either one of 
you as a continuation of my client’s brother, then we should be doubly happy 
if both of you exist. But I doubt if you really want to set up shop in Parfit’s 
camp. For one thing, you should know that he and your clone’s favored David 
Lewis had some disagreements. For a second thing, he tended to allow that 
survival required continuation of the same brain, something we have great 
reason to doubt, especially in your case, as the original brother only had one 
brain. Furthermore, Parfit had some very radical beliefs. He thought you 
owe more to somebody just like you existing now than you do to what we 
would normally think of as “you” in the past. And vice versa. So how are we 
to know that the earlier iteration of my client’s brother, the one who earned 
the money, would want either of you to have the money?”
“It’s true!” you pipe up, “He used to be cool! He got rich off a stupid startup 
and suddenly started watching Fox News and it rotted his brain! The brother 
who had the idea that made him rich would hate what he became!”
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Your lawyer frowns, but Brother C pounces: “HAH! You said I became. So, 
one, this is me, and two, I was just like this before we ever came across that 
stupid spaceship or whatever it was. And screw that other stuff, let’s focus 
on the “identity doesn’t matter” part. We all agree that what matters is 
preservation of memories, personality and all that. Well, they’re preserved 
perfectly. Ask me anything! I’ve got plenty of embarrassing stories about that 
little snot, for starters!” (He points at you.)
“But qualitative identity is not enough!” interjects your lawyer. “Numerical 
identity is what matters, and obviously you can’t both be the brother, and, as 
we have already said, any reason for denying that one of you is can be applied 
to the other. In fact, what you both are is walking examples of identity theft. 
Not only are you impersonating my client’s brother in a very upsetting 
fashion” (at this point you turn to the judge and try to look devastated) “you 
have made repeated attempts to access his money using passwords and pin 
numbers that were his confidential property.”
Brother C gets positively apoplectic at this point. “HOW CAN YOU ACCUSE 
ME OF STEALING SOMETHING THAT’S EMBEDDED IN MY MIND!?”
The lawyer retorts, “Admittedly it is not your fault that that information 
was put in your mind, but the fact remains that it was put there by alien 
technology. If your bank accidentally transferred millions of dollars from, say, 
Bill Gates’s account into yours, that doesn’t make it yours. And if, knowing 
that it is not yours, you nonetheless start acting like it is yours and using it, 
then you are guilty of trying to get away with theft.”
Brother B interjects: “But look, you’ve got me, us, caught in a Catch-22. We 
know that we are the person who made this money and put it into these 
accounts because we remember doing it and we remember setting up the 
passwords! We know the reason why we chose those passwords. Nobody 
else, not even the bank knows that! Only we do! But you’re saying those 
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very memories aren’t ours and that therefore we must have come by them 
perniciously. But why aren’t they our memories? I contend you’re working 
with outmoded intuitions. Suppose our scientists work out how this alien 
technology works and learn how to use it. Suppose we all have memory-
copiers built into our beds when we sleep. Then, one day, a brick falls on your 
head and you get total amnesia. But then we use the complete copy of your 
memories from the night before and restore you to the state you were before 
the brick. Nobody would deny that you were entitled to those memories, 
despite the fact that they were “put there because of alien technology,” would 
they? So I say how the memories arrived in my head make no difference to 
whether or not they’re mine. What makes them mine is that I made them. I 
own them because I produced them!”
This time the lawyer pounces: “You’re arguing in a circle! You’re saying that 
you produced them, but the real person who produced them stopped existing 
when that button was pushed, and you assume you’re him because you have 
his memories. The most we can really claim is that he produced you when he 
pressed that button.”
Brother C, who has calmed down a bit and has been listening intently, butts 
in: “Wait a minute: you say my past self “made” the two of us by pressing that 
button” (“No, just me” mutters Brother B) “then how is that different from 
how each of us “makes” our future selves merely by existing? I mean, the only 
reason you exist right now, standing there, is because your past self existed 
a moment before to cause your current self to come into existence. We just 
went about it a different way, but as my counterpart here just argued, the 
involvement of alien technology shouldn’t alter the underlying facts. We’re 
just trend-setters! In the future everyone will make copies of themselves 
before they take flights or have operations just to be safe in case something 
happens to the original. And science fiction aside: a lot of people believe 
that a perfect version of them appears in Heaven, complete with all their 
memories, the moment they die, despite the fact that their body, 100% of 
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it, stays put on Earth and starts to smell bad. Are you going to establish the 
impossibility of an afterlife by legal fiat?” 
Brother B chimes in: “You can’t just leave us in legal limbo, your honor! And if 
that lawyer is right and Horace Dent created us, then even if you don’t agree 
that at least one of us (me) is Horace Dent, we are at least “his” dependents. 
And if Horace Dent (again, me) is declared dead, shouldn’t his money go to 
his closest relatives? Well, you don’t get any closer than fucking identical! I 
still say I am Horace Dent, but if not, I’m either his child or his twin/triplet, 
and either way I take precedent over that thieving little jerk!” (pointing at 
you).
Just then, the judge raises her hand for quiet. “This is all very interesting. 
I must say I am finding our twin litigants’ arguments rather compelling. 
However, I am unable to get past the fact that there are two of you. To my 
mind, the presence of the second, duplicate, goes a long way to undermining 
both of your cases, both because he undermines the logic of identity but also 
because his existence implies that his twin is also a copy rather than the 
original brother magically whisked through space.”
Brother B has suddenly begun to look very thoughtful. He speaks up: “I 
would like to convene briefly with my co-litigant outside, please Your 
Honor.” Brother C does not seem happy with this and you watch them 
arguing vociferously, and continue to hear them through the open window of 
the courtroom as they get to the parking lot. Then there is the sound of a car 
door slamming and suddenly a shot rings out. You run to the window to see 
Brother B standing over Brother C with a smoking gun in his hand. He looks 
up to see the three of you staring at him and waves back, cheerfully. Stunned, 
your lawyer mutters, “well, so much for Parfit’s idea that you care most about 
people just like you.” Brother B then returns the gun to his car and comes 
back into the courtroom. “Did I just witness a fratricide or a suicide or both?” 
asks the Judge, drily. “Or did you just kill a dependent?” “I prefer to think of it 
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as an… amputation, Your Honor” says Brother B contentedly. “Now, what was 
it you were saying about finding my arguments rather compelling?”
The judge stares at him open-mouthed. Eventually she regains her composure. 
“The death of your lookalike cannot affect your status, other than, of course, 
to render you guilty of murder. If an amoeba splits and then a second later one 
of the resulting amoebas die, that doesn’t make the remaining one suddenly 
revert back to being the original, does it?”
Brother B looks earnest: “That’s entirely up to you, your honor. Surely this is 
a legal matter! If the Beatles split up in 1966 and John and George went one 
way and Paul and Ringo went the other, then neither pair could claim to be 
the Beatles. But then if John and George died in 1967 and Paul and Ringo 
wanted to release records under the name The Beatles, surely a court could 
make that happen? It happens with groups all the time – The Rolling Stones 
survived the loss of Brian Jones and Bill Wyman.”
“You’re pushing your luck, sir. Human beings are not conglomerates! In fact, 
I have made my decision: neither you nor that unfortunate corpse outside 
are Horace Dent. Horace Dent ceased to be at the moment he pressed the 
button on that infernal thing” (pointing at the dais). “However, just to let 
you know what your evil action has cost you: I decree that you both were 
nonetheless entitled to 1/3 of Dent’s fortune, with the remaining 1/3 going 
to Dent’s younger brother here. All that has changed in light of your cold-
blooded act of butchery, however, and you will likely lose control of any of 
Dent’s fortune as a result.”
A strange look flickers across B’s face, as he seems to be simultaneously 
taking in this news and looking for loopholes. Suddenly, he vaults into the 
center of the court and lunges at the dais. In a flash and a pop, a grey suit 
flutters to the floor and there is… well, somebody standing naked on the floor 
panel that had been in the little room in the alien craft. He radiates smugness 
as he strolls over to the pile of clothes and begins to get dressed. The judge, 
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however, is furious: “And just what did that little stunt accomplish, may I 
ask?” she says acidly. 
“I’ve just saved the legal system a great deal of money,” says the new Horace 
Dent clone. “The murderer of my poor unfortunate doppelganger out in the 
parking lot has been disposed of, so there is nobody to put on trial let alone 
execute or imprison. He’s gone. You yourself just decreed that use of this 
device destroys a human. I, meanwhile, am an entirely new being, as innocent 
as a new-born babe. Granted, I am a little traumatized by the memories I have 
of shooting someone who looked just like me, but I comfort myself with the 
words of my brother’s lawyer here, who argued that those memories were 
placed there by alien technology, and therefore just a tragic burden I have to 
bear rather than an indication that I did anything I should regret. But back 
to the business at hand: I believe I heard that I will be getting 2/3 of Horace 
Dent’s fortune?”
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